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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Railway. Co.,1 the Eighth 
Circuit split from two circuit courts when it adopted a new stance 
on the rule of unanimity,2 dealing with removal3 based on a federal 
question.4 Specifically, the court strayed from its prior precedent5 
when it held that representation in a removing defendant’s 
notice—stating that its codefendants consented to the removal—
satisfies the United States Code’s unanimity requirement.6 As part 
of its reasoning, the Eighth Circuit held that because the defendant 
who gives consent on behalf of the codefendants is subject to Rule 
11 sanctions,7 policy considerations support the validity of the 
consent.8 
This note begins by exploring the history, development, and 
construction of removal and the rule of unanimity in the United 
States.9 The note will then discuss the development of the rule of 
unanimity’s consent requirement as it has been used by the circuit 
 
 1.  785 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 2.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012). The rule of unanimity requires all 
defendants to join in or consent to removal from a state court on any civil action. 
Id. 
 3.  “Removal” is the process of allowing a defendant who has been sued in 
state court the opportunity to “substitute a federal forum for the state court 
originally selected by the plaintiff.” 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3721 (4th ed. 2008). 
 4.  See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1186–88 (explaining that the Eighth Circuit will 
now split away from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 
298, 301 (7th Cir. 1994) as well as the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Getty Oil Corp. v. 
Insurance Co. of North America, 841 F.2d 1254 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 5.  See Christiansen v. W. Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 
2012) (“We also emphasize that non-removing defendants who wish to evince 
consent to removal should either sign the notice of removal or file a timely and 
unequivocal consent to such course of conduct.”). 
 6.  See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1188. 
 7.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (explaining that sanctions may result when a party 
submits a pleading or motion to the court that includes assertions that lack 
evidentiary support). 
 8.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187 (“The potential for Rule 11 sanctions and a 
codefendant’s opportunity to alert the court to any falsities in the removing 
defendant’s notice serve as safeguards to prevent removing defendants from 
making false representations of unanimous consent and forcing codefendants into 
a federal forum against their will.”). 
 9.  See infra Part II. 
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courts.10 Next, this note will analyze an important case from the 
splitting Seventh Circuit court.11 Following the reasoning of the 
Seventh Circuit, this note will explain the facts of Griffioen and 
examine the reasoning of the majority opinion.12 Next, using 
statutory interpretation and policy implications brought about by 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the note will analyze the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision, showing that the court correctly veered 
away from its own prior decisions and the precedent set by the 
Seventh Circuit when it held that a sole defendant may give 
consent for codefendants.13 Finally, this note concludes by 
contending that although the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Griffioen 
was correct, the holding may have paved the way for defendants to 
exploit the rule of unanimity in order to force a non-consenting 
defendant into a federal forum against his or her will.14 
II. HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT LAW 
A. A Brief History of Removal 
Although the U.S. Constitution makes no mention of 
removal,15 and “[n]o procedure comparable to removal was 
available at English common law,”16 the principle underlying 
removal based on federal subject matter jurisdiction has been 
prominent in the development of U.S. procedural law.17 Over two 
centuries ago, in 1789, Congress enacted the first removal 
procedures in the United States.18 Congress did not include the 
foundation for removal based on federal subject matter jurisdiction 
 
 10.  See infra Section II.B. 
 11.  See infra Section III.A. 
 12.  See infra Section III.B. 
 13.  See infra Part IV. 
 14.  See infra Part V. 
 15.  See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of Removal, 77 
BROOK. L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“The United States Constitution expressly authorizes 
arising-under and diversity jurisdiction, without mentioning removal.”). 
 16.  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731. 
 17.  See Tristin K. Green, Complete Preemption—Removing the Mystery from 
Removal, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 363, 364 (1998) (“[Removal] has been a part of 
American jurisprudence for over 200 years.”). See generally Merrell Dow Pharm. v. 
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 807–09 (1986) (discussing the history of the removal 
process). 
 18.  Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73; see Bassett & Perschbacher, 
supra note 15, at 2; Green, supra note 17, at 364–65. 
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at that time.19 Instead, it took nearly one-hundred years until, in 
1875, Congress extended removal to include claims arising under 
federal subject matter jurisdiction.20 The only current significance 
of the 1875 Act, granting either party the right to remove based on 
federal subject matter, was that it was changed by the Removal Act 
of 1887 only twelve years later.21 
The Removal Act of 1887 provided for an important change in 
United States removal law when it expressly revised the provision of 
the 1875 Act which granted either party the right to remove to 
federal court based on federal subject matter jurisdiction.22 
Specifically, the Removal Act of 1887 expressly granted the 
defendant the right to remove to federal courts based on federal 
subject matter jurisdiction.23 This revision, which allowed for only 
defendants to remove based on federal question, is the basis for the 
current removal statute that is in place today.24 
B. History of the Unanimity Requirement 
In Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Martin,25 the 
theory of the rule of unanimity was first brought to the Supreme 
Court’s attention.26 Martin dealt with a wrongful death lawsuit 
 
 19.  See § 12, 1 Stat. 73; Green, supra note 17, at 365 (“In that Act, however, 
removal was limited to actions in diversity.”). 
 20.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (“[For] any suit 
of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now pending or hereafter brought in any State 
court . . . and arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . either 
party may . . . remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for the 
proper district.”). 
 21.  See Adam R. Prescott, On Removal Jurisdiction’s Unanimous Consent 
Requirement, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 235, 241 (2011). 
 22.  See Judiciary Act of 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553; Prescott, supra 
note 21, at 241; Diversity Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, FED. JUD. CTR., http:// 
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction_diversity.html (last visited Mar. 
4, 2016). 
 23.  See § 2, 24 Stat. at 553; Prescott, supra note 21, at 241. 
 24.  See 28 U.S.C § 1441 (2012) (“[A]ny civil action brought in a State court of 
which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant or the defendants . . . .”) (emphasis added); Green, supra 
note 17, at 365. 
 25.  178 U.S. 245, 246 (1900). 
 26.  See Marie E. Chafe & Peter M. Durney, The Rules on Removal in Multiple-
Party Cases: A Reprise, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. (Aug. 16, 2012), http:// 
apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/masstorts/articles/summer2012       
-0812-rules-removal-multiple-party-cases-reprisal.html. 
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against two railroad companies.27 One of the defendant railway 
companies—Union Pacific Railway Company—sought to remove 
the action from Kansas state court to federal court.28 The 
remaining defendantChicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railroad 
Companydid not join in the removal.29 This circumstance 
presented the Court with a difficult question: “[W]hether it was 
necessary for the Chicago, Rock Island, & Pacific Railroad 
Company, defendant, to join in the application of its codefendants, 
the receivers of the Union Pacific Railway Company, to effect a 
removal to the circuit court.”30 Ultimately, the Court held that “a 
removal could not be effected unless all the parties on the same 
side of the controversy united in the petition.”31 This holding thus 
brought about the notion that, in a case involving multiple 
defendants, each defendant must join in the removal. 
The principle of unanimity in removal motions existed as 
merely case law until 2011, when President Obama signed into law 
the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 
2011.32 One of the purposes of this Act was to “make several 
changes to judicial procedures, including the determination of 
original jurisdiction and court venue for certain types of cases.”33 
Importantly, this Act expressly codified the requirement of 
unanimity among multiple defendants in a removal motion.34 
Section 1446 of the United States Code states: “When a civil action 
is removed solely under section 1441(a), all defendants who have 
been properly joined and served must join in or consent to the removal 
of the action.”35 
 
 27.  See Martin, 178 U.S. at 246. 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See id. The Supreme Court did not explain why Chicago, Rock Island, & 
Pacific Railroad Company did not consent to removal. Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 248. 
 32.  See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446); Jayne S. 
Ressler, Removing Removal’s Unanimity Rule, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1391, 1392 (2013). 
 33.  H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 4 (2011). 
 34.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
 35.  Id. (emphasis added). 
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1. History of the Unanimity Requirement of the Eighth Circuit and 
Other Circuits Adopting the Sole Consent Rule 
Much of the debate surrounding the rule of unanimity does 
not deal directly with the notion of whether each defendant is 
required to submit some form of consent to removal. Instead, the 
major issue that courts have struggled with historically has been 
when the thirty-day time frame that allows for consent is to 
commence.36 Prior to the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act 
of 2011,37 the codification of the removal statute was as follows: 
The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall 
be filed within thirty days after the receipt by the defendant, 
through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial 
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which 
such action or proceeding is based, or within thirty days 
after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial 
pleading has then been filed in court and is not required 
to be served on the defendant, whichever period is 
shorter. 
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, 
a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after 
receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of 
a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other 
paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case 
is one which is or has become removable, except that a 
case may not be removed on the basis of jurisdiction 
conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year 
after commencement of the action.38 
As the language of the former statute suggests, there is 
ambiguity in determining how this statute would apply when there 
are multiple defendants.39 Should the thirty-day countdown that 
 
 36.  Ressler, supra note 32, at 1402 (“The unanimity rule complicated the 
calculation of the thirty-day requirement when there were multiple defendants, 
because there were no directives as to when the removal clock began . . . . The 
absence of clear congressional guidelines created tremendous procedural 
difficulty for the judiciary. Judges expressed concern that the rules ‘force them to 
waste time determining jurisdictional issues at the expense of adjudicating 
underlying litigation.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 112-10, at 4)). 
 37.  Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. 
No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446). 
 38.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 39.  See Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 15, at 8 (“The removal statutes are 
silent as to how to reconcile the thirty-day time limit with differences in the timing 
of service of multiple defendants.”). 
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allows for a notice of removal start when the first defendant is 
served with the complaint? Or should the countdown begin when 
the final defendant is served with the complaint? Or should some 
other interpretation prevail? 
In order to help resolve this ambiguity, the courts developed 
three different rules for interpreting how to comply with the 
statute: (1) the first-served defendant rule, (2) the intermediate 
rule, and (3) the last-served defendant rule.40 “The significance of 
these rules stems from their connection to still another judicially 
created rule—the rule of unanimity.”41 
a. The First-Served Defendant Rule 
Under the first-served defendant rule, the time frame for 
allowing a defendant to file a motion to remove to federal court 
begins the day that the first defendant is served and continues for 
thirty days thereafter.42 Therefore, any subsequent defendant 
served with a complaint after the first-served defendant has the 
same amount of time remaining to file a motion to remove as the 
first-served defendant, which would ultimately be less than thirty 
days.43 
The theory of the first-served defendant rule has been met 
with some criticism.44 Under the first-served defendant rule, 
subsequent defendants may not have the opportunity to convince 
the first-served defendant that removal is the proper course of 
action.45 Additionally, plaintiffs may intentionally wait to serve the 
 
 40.  See id.; Ressler, supra note 32, at 1402–03. 
 41.  Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 15, at 8 (citing Scott R. Haiber, 
Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 648–49 (2004)). 
 42.  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731; Ressler, supra note 32, at 1403. 
 43.  Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir. 1986) (“The general 
rule, however, is that ‘[i]f the first served defendant abstains from seeking removal 
or does not effect a timely removal, subsequently served defendants cannot 
remove . . . due to the rule of unanimity among defendants which is required for 
removal.’” (quoting 1A JAMES W. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.168, at 
586–87 (2d ed. 1985)); see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731 (“[A] failure of the 
first defendant served in the state court action to file a notice of removal with the 
district court within 30 days of service will prevent all subsequently served 
defendants from removing the action.”). 
 44.  See Paul E. Lund, The Timeliness of Removal and Multiple-Defendant Lawsuits, 
64 BAYLOR L. REV. 50, 66 (2012) (citing Brown, 792 F.2d at 482). 
 45.  WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731 (“[W]hen some of the defendants are 
served after the first-served defendant has failed to exercise its removal right 
7
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subsequent defendants until the thirty-day window has passed, thus 
depriving them of any chance at removal.46 
b. The Intermediate Rule 
The Fourth Circuit took a different approach to the timeliness 
of removal in McKinney v. Board of Trustees of Mayland Community 
College.47 In McKinney, the Fourth Circuit became the first court to 
introduce the intermediate rule.48 The intermediate rule is similar 
to the first-served defendant rule in the sense that at the time of the 
first-served defendant’s service, the thirty-day time frame for 
making a motion to remove commences.49 Thus, if the first-served 
defendant does not file a motion to remove within thirty days of 
service, subsequently served defendants may not remove the case to 
federal court.50 The significance of the intermediate rule is that it 
allows subsequently served defendants a full thirty days to consent to 
the first-served defendant’s motion to remove, if the first-served 
defendant makes such a motion.51 
 
within the statutory period, the subsequently served defendants are deprived of 
the opportunity to persuade the first defendant to join the notice of removal.”). 
 46.  See id. (explaining that a “plaintiff could choose to serve an 
unsophisticated or poorly-advised defendant,” while intentionally refraining from 
serving other defendants until the thirty days had passed); see also Ressler, supra 
note 32, at 1405 (citing Lund, supra note 44, at 78 n.157, 79) (“Indeed, observers 
lamented the opportunities available to plaintiffs to utilize the removal clock, in 
conjunction with the requirements of the unanimity rule, to their advantage and 
to strategically stagger service upon defendants in order to prevent otherwise 
proper removal.”). 
 47.  955 F.2d 924 (4th Cir. 1992). 
 48.  See id. at 926–28. 
 49.  See Barbour v. Int’l Union, 640 F.3d 599, 612 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
first-served defendant must file a notice of removal within thirty days of service; 
later-served defendants have to join the notice within thirty days of service upon 
them.”); see also Lund, supra note 44, at 76–77 (citing Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612) 
(“Typically referred to as the intermediate rule, the Fourth Circuit’s approach 
bears some resemblance to the first-served defendant rule, in that it requires that a 
notice of removal be filed within thirty days of service on the first-served 
defendant. If the first-served defendant does not file a notice, the case cannot be 
removed.”). 
 50.  Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 15, at 16 (“Thus, under the so-called 
intermediate rule, the time for removal expires thirty days after the first defendant 
is served, without regard to when other defendants are served—the same result 
required by the first-served defendant rule.”); Lund, supra note 44, at 77 (citing 
Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612). 
 51.  See Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612. 
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Similar to the first-served defendant rule, the intermediate 
rule has been criticized as enabling plaintiffs to manipulate the 
proceedings.52 For example, under the intermediate rule, a plaintiff 
may still simply wait until the first-served defendant’s thirty-day 
window has passed to serve a subsequent defendant, even if the 
first-served defendant makes a motion to remove, thus depriving 
the subsequent defendant of the opportunity to join in the 
removal.53 
c. The Last-Served Defendant Rule 
Concern over plaintiffs’ unfair tactics in removal actions 
brought about a new rule for dealing with multiple defendants.54 In 
Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.,55 the Sixth Circuit became 
the first court to apply the last-served defendant rule.56 Under the 
last-served defendant rule, “each defendant [has] thirty days to file 
a notice of removal from the date of its own personal service, 
without regard to the date of service on earlier-served defendants 
in the suit.”57 Thus, each defendant receives a new thirty days to 
either consent to removal or make its own motion to remove to 
federal court.58 Two years after the Brierly holding, the Eighth 
 
 52.  Compare Ressler, supra note 32, at 1404 (“Both the first-served defendant 
and the intermediate/McKinney rules were ripe for manipulation by plaintiffs.”), 
with Barbour, 640 F.3d at 612 (“It is also worth noting that, under the McKinney 
Intermediate Rule, the later-served defendants are in no worse position than they 
would have been if the parties in the case were not completely diverse or the first-
served defendant (or any other defendant) had opposed removal.”). 
 53.  See Ressler, supra note 32, at 1404 (explaining that a plaintiff could wait 
until the thirty-day window had passed “and then serve additional defendants”). 
 54.  See Lund, supra note 44, at 69; see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731 
(“Because the first-served defendant rule deprives subsequently served defendants 
of the opportunity to remove, the Sixth Circuit held in Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible 
Packaging, Inc. that the last-served defendant should be allowed a full 30 days to 
remove after being served.”). 
 55.  184 F.3d 527 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 56.  See id. at 533 (“[W]e hold that a later-served defendant has 30 days from 
the date of service to remove a case to federal district court, with the consent of 
the remaining defendants.”); Lund, supra note 44, at 70. 
 57.  Ressler, supra note 32, at 1404–05 (citing Bailey v. Janssen 
Pharmaceutica, Inc., 536 F.3d 1202, 1208–09 (11th Cir. 2008)). Ressler further 
explains that courts adopted the rule because it was “more consistent with the 
statutory removal language.” Id. at 1405. 
 58.  See Brierly, 184 F.3d at 533 (holding that a subsequently served defendant 
“has 30 days from the date of service to remove a case to federal district court, with 
9
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Circuit adopted this last-served defendant rule in Marano Enterprises 
of Kansas v. Z-Teca Restaurants, L.P.59 Specifically, the Eighth Circuit 
held that “the later-served defendants in this case had thirty days 
from the date of service on them to file a notice of removal with the 
unanimous consent of their co-defendants, even though the first-
served co-defendants did not file a notice of removal within thirty 
days of service on them.”60 In recent years, courts have shifted 
toward the adoption of the last-served defendant rule.61 The recent 
enactment of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act of 2011 expressly codified this rule.62 
C. History of the Circuit Courts as It Relates to Giving Consent to 
Removal 
Importantly, this note now turns to the history of the consent 
requirement needed to satisfy the rule of unanimity63 prior to the 
enactment of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act of 2011, which was the Act on which the Griffioen 
court partially based its holding.64 In other words, this section 
details the form of consent needed to properly join a removal. 
 
the consent of the remaining defendants”). 
 59.  254 F.3d 753, 756 (8th Cir. 2001) (“We conclude that, if faced with the 
issue before us today, the Court would allow each defendant thirty days after 
receiving service within which to file a notice of removal, regardless of when—or 
if—previously served defendants had filed such notices.”); Lund, supra note 44, at 
70. 
 60.  Marano, 254 F.3d at 757. 
 61.  Destfino v. Reiswig, 630 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The trend in 
recent case law favors the later-served defendant rule.”); Ressler, supra note 32, at 
1404 (“Recently, courts moved toward adoption of the ‘last-served defendant’ 
rule.”). 
 62.  See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758, 760 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 14 (2011) (“New subparagraph 1446(b)(2)(B) 
provides that each defendant will have 30 days from his or her own date of service 
(or receipt of initial pleading) to seek removal.”); Elizabeth L. Alvine, Note, 
Jurisdictional Remix: The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Presents 
New Challenges to Federal Litigation, 89 N.D. L. REV. 163, 171 (2013). 
 63.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012). The rule of unanimity requires all 
defendants to join in or consent to removal from a state court on any civil action. 
 64.  Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (“So also here, we are once again disinclined to adopt a hard-line 
requirement, particularly in light of the new language of § 1446. The 2011 
amendments to § 1446 that codified the rule of unanimity did not describe the 
10
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Historically, circuit courts have been at odds with each other in 
determining whether the consent requirement of the rule of 
unanimity has been met.65 Courts have wrestled with whether a sole 
defendant may consent for his codefendants, or whether each 
defendant needs to individually give some form of written 
consent.66 
1. A Sole Defendant Can “Vouch” for the Consent of Its 
Codefendants in a Motion to Remove to Federal Court 
Prior to the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act of 2011, several circuit courts held that a sole 
defendant may give consent for its codefendants in a motion to 
remove to federal court.67 This theory is sometimes called the 
“vouching rule.”68 The majority of these decisions looked at the 
statutory language;69 specifically, the courts pointed out that 28 
U.S.C. § 1446, the removal statute, required consent of the parties 
to be signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.70 Accordingly, these courts subsequently explained that 
under Rule 11, only one attorney of record needs to certify that the 
 
form of or time frame for consent when multiple defendants are involved.”). 
 65.  See Kathryn A. Kotlik, Note, Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.: The 
Ninth Circuit Failed to Follow the Rule of Unanimity When Applying Rule 11 to a Case with 
Multiple Defendants, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 261, 261 (2010) (“Although the rule of 
unanimity is well-settled, federal courts have disagreed over the ways defendants 
may satisfy the rule.”); Prescott, supra note 21, at 247 (“Although there is no 
reason to doubt the future of the unanimity rule itself, federal courts are divided 
regarding the functional application of the rule in multi-defendant lawsuits.”). 
 66.  See Prescott, supra note 21, at 247 (“Some federal courts require each 
defendant to submit his own consent form, whereas other federal courts allow one 
defendant to pledge in the notice of removal that all the other defendants have 
consented.”).  
 67.  See, e.g., Proctor v. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc., 584 F.3d 1208, 1225 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (“[W]e interpret that requirement [of unanimity] as met if, as here, 
one defendant avers that all defendants consent to removal.”); Harper v. 
AutoAlliance Int’l Inc., 392 F.3d 195, 201–02 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Prescott, 
supra note 21, at 247–50 (discussing the Proctor and Vishay holdings). 
 68.  See, e.g., Prescott, supra note 21, at 247. 
 69.  See, e.g., Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225. 
 70.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2012) (“A defendant or defendants desiring to 
remove any civil action from a State court shall file in the district court of the 
United States for the district and division within which such action is pending a 
notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . .”). 
11
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contentions have factual support.71 Thus, the courts concluded that 
a single attorney may give consent for a party’s codefendants.72 This 
was the conclusion reached in Harper v. AutoAlliance International, 
Inc.73 
In Harper, the plaintiff brought suit against three different 
defendants alleging retaliatory discharge after he filed with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.74 Asserting that the 
allegations were based on federal subject matter jurisdiction, 
AutoAlliance and Childress, two of the three defendants, jointly 
filed a notice of removal to the federal courts.75 Kelly, the third 
defendant, did not sign the notice of removal submitted by his 
codefendants.76 However, similar to the defendants in Griffioen,77 
AutoAlliance and Childress’ notice of removal stated, “Counsel for 
AutoAlliance, AAI and Childress has obtained concurrence from 
counsel for the UAW, who represents defendant Jeffrey Kelly, in 
removing this matter.”78 Reasoning that Rule 11 requires only one 
attorney of record to certify the contentions have factual support,79 
the Harper court held that “[n]othing in Rule 11 . . . required Kelly 
or his attorney to submit a pleading, written motion, or other paper 
directly expressing that concurrence or prohibited counsel for the 
 
 71.  See Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225; Harper, 392 F.3d at 201 (pointing out that 
under Rule 11, any pleading needs to be signed “by at least one attorney of 
record” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a))). 
 72.  See Proctor, 584 F.3d at 1225 (“Applying these general principles, we 
conclude that the filing of a notice of removal can be effective without individual 
consent documents on behalf of each defendant.”); Harper, 392 F.3d at 201–02 
(noting that in the event a notice of removal misrepresented a defendant’s assent 
to the removal, “no doubt [that defendant] would have brought this 
misrepresentation to the court’s attention and [the court could] . . . have 
impose[d] appropriate sanctions”). 
 73.  See Harper, 392 F.3d at 201. 
 74.  See id. at 198 (“On June 28, 2002, Harper, an African-American, filed a 
complaint in Wayne County Circuit Court against Defendants AutoAlliance, AAI, 
Kelly, and Allen Childress, a supervisor at AutoAlliance’s facility in Flat Rock, 
Michigan. Harper alleged that Childress gave preferential treatment to non-
minority staff, and . . . Harper filed a grievance and then a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission . . . .”). 
 75.  See id. at 199. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185 
(8th Cir. 2015) (explaining that one defendant’s notice for removal expressly 
stated that its codefendants had given consent to the removal). 
 78.  Harper, 392 F.3d at 199. 
 79.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
12
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other defendants from making such a representation on Kelly’s 
behalf.”80 The court subtly added another minor policy reason for 
allowing a sole defendant to consent for its codefendants. 
Specifically, the court pointed out that the defendant who did not 
expressly join in consenting to the removal would have brought the 
courts attention to the issue if the defendant wished for the case to 
remain in state court or if the codefendant claiming all parties 
consented did so through misrepresentation.81 
2. A Single Defendant Cannot Give Consent for Its Codefendants in 
a Motion to Remove to Federal Court 
Prior to the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act of 2011, in opposition to allowing a single 
defendant to consent for its codefendants, some courts required 
that each defendant individually express his or her consent for 
removal.82 By requiring all defendants to individually express their 
consent, some courts have coined this requirement as the 
“independent-and-unambiguous consent requirement.”83 Courts 
that have applied the independent-and-unambiguous consent 
requirement have a different interpretation of Rule 11.84 Courts 
applying this rule believe that each defendant’s attorney must file 
an independent consent.85 
 
 80.  Harper, 392 F.3d at 201–02. 
 81.  See id. at 202 (“Had counsel for AutoAlliance, AAI and Childress 
misrepresented Kelly’s concurrence in the removal, no doubt Kelly would have 
brought this misrepresentation to the court’s attention and it would have been 
within the district court’s power to impose appropriate sanctions, including a 
remand to state court.”). 
 82.  Kotlik, supra note 65, at 261–62; see Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 
1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that there must “be some timely filed written 
indication from each served defendant” (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. 
Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1261 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988))); Roe v. O’Donohue, 38 F.3d 298, 
301 (7th Cir. 1994) (“To ‘join’ a motion is to support it in writing, which the other 
defendants here did not.”), abrogated by Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe 
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999).  
 83.  Prescott, supra note 21, at 252. 
 84.  Compare Harper, 392 F.3d at 201 (pointing out that, under rule 11, any 
pleading needs to be signed “by at least one attorney of record”), with Creekmore 
v. Food Lion, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 505, 508 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“Rule 11 does not 
authorize one party to make representations or file pleadings on behalf of 
another.”). 
 85.  See Creekmore, 797 F. Supp. at 508 (“Both Stanley Works and Carolina 
Door are represented by counsel and clearly are ‘movants’ subject to the 
13
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Advocates of the independent-and-unambiguous consent 
requirement argue that requiring individual consent from each 
defendant serves the interests of both the plaintiffs and the 
defendants.86 Specifically, a plaintiff stands to gain from requiring 
each defendant to individually consent to removal because under 
the voucher rule, a plaintiff’s original decision to file in state court 
could be disrupted by a single defendant erroneously vouching for 
consent of its codefendants.87 The independent-and-unambiguous 
rule also benefits the defendants.88 For example, a defendant could 
intentionally misrepresent that its codefendants consent to 
removal, without providing the codefendants notice that it has 
done so.89 In such a situation, the non-consenting defendants “are 
now stuck in federal court unless and until they move to have the 
case remanded—assuming there is no jurisdictional flaw that 
prompts the court to remand the case sua sponte.”90 
 
requirements of Rule 11. They must file their own signed pleadings.”). 
 86.  See Esposito v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 590 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(“The requirement of unanimity serves the interests of plaintiffs, defendants and 
the judiciary.”); Sansone v. Morton Mach. Works, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 
(D.R.I. 2002) (“One of the purposes of this ‘rule of unanimity’ is to prevent the 
defendants from gaining an unfair tactical advantage by splitting the litigation and 
requiring the plaintiff to pursue the case in two fora simultaneously . . . .”); Martin 
Oil Co. v. Phila. Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 1236, 1238 (N.D. W. Va. 1993) 
(explaining that “requiring each defendant to either sign the notice of removal, 
file its own notice of removal, or file a written consent or written joinder to the 
original notice of removal” ensures that unanimity has been achieved). 
 87.  Prescott, supra note 21, at 269–70 (“It also better protects the plaintiff’s 
forum choice: when there is doubt in the removal procedure, which occurs when 
one defendant vouches for the other’s consent rather than each defendant 
individually expressing consent, an approach that creates exceptions for 
defendants and lowers the requirements for removal facilitates a defendant’s 
ability to disrupt the plaintiff’s original decision to litigate in state court.”). 
 88.  See Esposito, 590 F.3d at 75; Prescott, supra note 21, at 274 (“[T]he 
independent consent requirement ensures that all nonmoving defendants are 
afforded proper notice before being haled into federal court, as due process 
requires. If every federal court adopts the independent-and-unambiguous consent 
requirement, all parties to a lawsuit—both plaintiffs and defendants—will 
immediately benefit from the efficiency and simplicity of the rule.”). 
 89.  See Prescott, supra note 21, at 264 (“[T]he court assumes that given the 
moving defendant’s vouching of consent and the nonmoving defendant’s lack of 
resistance, the nonmoving defendant is aware that he is an official party to a 
lawsuit in federal court. The nonmoving defendant, however, is not guaranteed 
such notice.”). 
 90.  Id. at 265. 
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Prior to the codification of the rule of unanimity—and prior to 
the Griffioen holding—the Eighth Circuit believed the independent-
and-unambiguous consent rule was the proper way to analyze         
§ 1446.91 Specifically, in Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., Pritchett and other 
plaintiffs filed a products liability action against Cottrell and other 
defendants.92 After the complaint had been filed, Cottrell filed a 
motion to move to federal court, to which all but one defendant 
had expressly consented.93 Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to 
remand the action to state court, arguing that unanimous consent 
had been improper.94 The court was thus tasked with determining 
whether consent to the removal had been met.95 
In its holding, the court points out that each defendant does 
not need to ultimately sign the notice of removal,96 which the court 
in Griffioen also alludes to in its holding.97 However, in Pritchett, the 
Eighth Circuit expressly stated, “[t]here must, however, ‘be some 
timely filed written indication from each served defendant,’ or 
from some person with authority to act on the defendant’s behalf, 
indicating that the defendant ‘has actually consented’ to the 
removal.”98 Thus, prior to the enactment of the Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, the Eighth Circuit 
advocated for the independent-and-unambiguous consent rule.99 
The splitting approaches to the consent requirement of the rule of 
unanimity were the focal point of Griffioen.100 
 
 91.  See Pritchett v. Cottrell, Inc., 512 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008); see also 
Kotlik, supra note 65, at 271 (explaining that the Eighth Circuit required “each 
defendant [to] submit written indication of its consent to the removal”). 
 92.  512 F.3d at 1058–59. Pritchett, Scott, and Fix filed a claim alleging that 
they had sustained injuries due to a faulty ratchet system designed by one of the 
defendants, Cottrell. Id. 
 93.  Id. at 1061 (“Cottrell filed a Notice of Removal of Civil Action in federal 
court with the consent of every defendant except JCT. The written consents were 
attached to the Notice of Removal as an exhibit.”). 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See id. at 1062. 
 96.  Id. (“While the failure of one defendant to consent renders the removal 
defective, each defendant need not necessarily sign the notice of removal.”). 
 97.  See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187 
(8th Cir. 2015). 
 98.  Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1062 (quoting Getty Oil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
841 F.2d 1254, 1261 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988)). 
 99.  See id. at 1062; Kotlik, supra note 65, at 271. 
 100.  See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1186–87 (explaining that neither the Supreme 
Court nor Congress have directly addressed what form consent must take, and 
15
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III. CASE DESCRIPTIONS 
A. Facts, Procedure, and Holding of the Splitting Seventh Circuit 
In Roe v. O’Donohue,101 the Seventh Circuit took a different 
approach than the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Griffioen concerning 
the consent requirement of the rule of unanimity. In Roe, the 
plaintiff (Roe) underwent a medical procedure in 1984.102 During 
his procedure, Roe was given a transfusion of cryoprecipitate AHF, 
which is a type of blood product.103 Following the procedure, Roe 
was diagnosed with the HIV disease.104 It was Roe’s belief that he 
contracted HIV as a result of receiving the cryoprecipitate.105 Roe 
brought suit against three different defendants: (1) the American 
Red Cross; (2) the doctor who recommended the surgery, 
including the hospital where it was performed; and (3) the doctors 
who actually performed the surgery.106 Roe initially filed his lawsuit 
in state court.107 Similar to Union Pacific in Griffioen, the Red Cross 
defendants “removed the case to federal court, representing that 
the other defendants ‘do not object to the removal of this action to 
federal court.’”108 Thus, the facts are similar to those of Griffioen in 
the sense that one defendant sought to satisfy the rule of unanimity 
by stating the codefendants do not object to the removal.109 
The Seventh Circuit pointed to the Red Cross defendant’s 
statement that “[a]ll other defendants who have been served with 
 
therefore the circuit courts are split). 
 101.  38 F.3d 298 (7th Cir. 1994), abrogated by Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe 
Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999). 
 102.  Id. at 300. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. The Red Cross was responsible for collecting and distributing the 
cryoprecipitate. Id. Roe alleged that the Red Cross was “negligent in collecting and 
distributing blood containing the virus.” Id. He alleged that the recommending 
doctor and hospital were “negligent in recommending the operation and failing 
to warn about the risks of using cryoprecipitate.” Id. He also alleged that the 
doctors performed the surgery negligently. Id. 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. The Red Cross’ basis for removal was 36 U.S.C. § 300105(a)(5) 
(2012), which states that the Red Cross may “sue and be sued in courts of law and 
equity, State or Federal, within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. 
 109.  See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185 
(8th Cir. 2015); Roe, 38 F.3d at 300. 
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summons in this action have stated that they do not object to the 
removal of this action to federal court,” and held that “[u]nder 
ordinary standards, this is deficient.”110 The court went on to say, 
“To ‘join’ a motion is to support it in writing, which the other 
defendants here did not.”111 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit 
differs from the Eight Circuit when dealing with the consent 
requirement of the rule of unanimity.112 
B. Facts, Procedure, and Holding of Griffioen 
Mark Griffioen, Mike and Joyce Ludvicek, Sandra Skelton, and 
Brian Vanous (Griffioen Group) were injured when the Cedar 
River flooded in 2008.113 The Griffioen Group owned various plots 
of land throughout Cedar Rapids, Iowa.114 At varying points of the 
river, the defendants, (collectively, the Rail Group) owned and 
maintained various railway bridges that spanned the width of the 
river.115 In June 2008, the Cedar River crested at its highest point in 
recorded history.116 To combat the potential flooding, the Rail 
Group placed railcars filled with rocks or other heaving materials 
along some of the bridges that spanned the river.117 The Griffioen 
Group alleged that because of the Rail Group’s actions—weighing 
down the railroad cars—the bridge became unstable.118 Sometime 
in late June, some of the Rail Group owned railway bridges along 
the Cedar River collapsed, which caused the river to dam.119 
Because of the bridges’ collapse, the Griffioen Group maintains 
 
 110.  Roe, 38 F.3d at 301. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Compare Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185 (granting the notion that a single 
defendant can satisfy the rule of unanimity requirement mandating all defendants 
to consent to removal), with Roe, 38 F.3d at 300 (denying the notion that a single 
defendant can give consent for its codefendants, absent express written consent 
from the codefendants). 
 113.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185. 
 114.  Appellant Brief at 5, Griffioen, 785 F.3d 1182 (No. 13-3170), 2013 WL 
6729371, at *5. 
 115.  See id.; Brief of Defendants-Appellees Union Pacific Railroad Co. & 
Union Pacific Corp. at 2, Griffioen, 785 F.3d 1182 (No. 13-3170), 2014 WL 586958, 
at *2. 
 116.  See, e.g., Brief of Defendants-Appellees Union Pacific Railroad Co. & 
Union Pacific Corp., supra note 115, at 2. 
 117.  See id. 
 118.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185. 
 119.  Id. 
17
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that the water from the Cedar River was diverted onto their land, 
thus causing them damage.120 
The Griffioen Group brought suit in Iowa state court against 
Union Pacific Railway Company and Union Pacific Corporation 
(collectively, Union Pacific), Cedar Rapids and Iowa City Railway, 
and Alliant Energy Corporation (collectively, CRANDIC), and ten 
additional defendants (collectively, the Stickle Defendants).121 On 
June 7, 2013, the Griffioen Group served the CRANDIC defendants 
with their complaint.122 The following day, the Stickle Defendants 
were served with the complaint.123 Two days later, on June 10, 2013, 
Union Pacific was served with the complaint.124 In their complaint, 
the Griffioen Group claimed that the Rail Group neglected to 
adequately build and maintain railroad bridges over the Cedar 
River.125 
Union Pacific filed a notice of removal based on federal 
question jurisdiction on July 2, 2013.126 In its notice, Union Pacific 
stated, “Undersigned counsel . . . have contacted attorneys for the 
other named co-defendants in this matter, and there is no 
objection to removal.”127 Along with this notice was a signed local 
rule certification stating, “The co-defendants have given their 
consent to the removal of this action.”128 Union Pacific’s notice of 
removal was within the thirty-day time frame of § 1446.129 On July 
10, 2013, the thirtieth day for filing a notice of removal, CRANDIC 
filed a written consent to the removal.130 On July 31, 2013, which is 
outside of the thirty-day window allowing a party to consent to 
removal,131 the Stickle Defendants filed consent to the removal.132 
 
 120.  See id. 
 121.  Id. Union Pacific filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which 
the district court granted. Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. Specifically, the alleged claims were based on the theories of 
negligence, strict liability for dangerous or ultra-hazardous activity, and strict 
liability based on Iowa Code sections 468.148 and 327F.2. Id. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2012). 
 130.  Brief of Defendants-Appellees Union Pacific Railroad Co. & Union 
Pacific Corp., supra note 115, at 2. 
 131.  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3731; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 
 132.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1185. The Griffioen Group had already filed a 
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The question before the court was whether, based on the 
consent of a single defendant that stated all codefendants consent 
to the removal, the rule of unanimity had been satisfied.133 The 
court correctly pointed out that “removal based on a federal 
question requires the unanimous consent of all defendants.”134 
However, this was the first time that the Eighth Circuit had been 
presented with “the question [of] whether a representation in a 
removing defendant’s notice stating that its codefendants consent 
can satisfy § 1446’s unanimity requirement.”135 
Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit concluded that a single 
defendant can satisfy the unanimous consent requirement of          
§ 1446.136 The court pointed out that its own holding in Pritchett v. 
Cottrell137 “left open the possibility that the unanimity requirement 
could be met when the removing defendant gives notice of its 
codefendants’ consent.”138 The Eighth Circuit pointed to the new 
language of § 1146—the rule of unanimity statute—which does not 
prescribe the particular form or time frame for cases involving 
multiple defendants.139 Thus, the court concluded that without a 
bright-line form of consent codified in statute, the court was 
unwilling to adopt a rule that “places form over substance.”140 
 
motion to remand, arguing that because not all of the defendants had consented 
within the thirty-day time frame, removal was improper. 
 133.  See id. at 1186–87. 
 134.  Id. at 1186; see also Ressler, supra note 32, at 1396 (“[A]ll defendants in a 
removable action must agree to removal or the case remains in state court.”). 
 135.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187. 
 136.  See id. at 1188 (“We therefore hold that a defendant’s timely removal 
notice indicating consent on behalf of a codefendant, signed and certified 
pursuant to Rule 11 and followed by the filing of a notice of consent from the 
codefendant itself, sufficiently establishes that codefendant’s consent to 
removal.”). 
 137.  512 F.3d 1057, 1062 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 138.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187; see also Pritchett, 512 F.3d at 1062 (“While the 
failure of one defendant to consent renders the removal defective, each defendant 
need not necessarily sign the notice of removal.”). But see Christiansen v. W. 
Branch Cmty. Sch. Dist., 674 F.3d 927, 933 (8th Cir. 2012) (“We also emphasize 
that non-removing defendants who wish to evince consent to removal should 
either sign the notice of removal or file a timely and unequivocal consent to such 
course of conduct.”).  
 139.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2012); Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187 (“Congress could 
have defined with equal specificity the form of or time for consent but chose not 
to do so.”). 
 140.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187. 
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Importantly, the Eighth Circuit court also pointed to policy 
considerations that supported the notion of a single defendant 
consenting for its codefendants.141 In particular, the court reasoned 
that when a defendant gives consent for its codefendants in a 
removal action, accompanied by a local rule certification, the 
moving defendant subjects himself to Rule 11 sanctions.142 This 
subjection to sanctions provides opportunities for codefendants “to 
alert the court to any falsities in the removing defendant’s notice 
serve as safeguards to prevent removing defendants from making 
false representations of unanimous consent and forcing 
codefendants into a federal forum against their will.”143 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The court in Griffioen correctly decided the question of 
whether, under § 1446, a single defendant can give consent for all 
defendants in a multi-defendant action.144 However, the court in 
Griffioen neglected to delve deep enough into the underlying 
reasons for allowing a sole defendant to give consent. Using 
statutory interpretation to a greater extent than the court in 
Griffioen, § 1446 does not require all defendants to individually 
express their consent to removal.145 Perhaps most importantly, this 
analysis will address the ethical considerations that an attorney is 
subjected to under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that 
the court could have used to further support its holding.146 
A. Statutory Interpretation 
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and 
Venue Clarification Act of 2011, § 1446 did not codify the rule of 
unanimity set forth in Chicago Rock Island.147 Instead, the language 
 
 141.  See id. (“Furthermore, we believe that policy considerations support the 
validity of the consent in the circumstances of this case.”).  
 142.  Id. at 1187–88; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 143.  Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187. 
 144.  See id. at 1188 (“We therefore hold that a defendant’s timely removal 
notice indicating consent on behalf of a codefendant, signed and certified 
pursuant to Rule 11 and followed by the filing of a notice of consent from the 
codefendant itself, sufficiently establishes that codefendant’s consent to 
removal.”). 
 145.  See infra Section IV.A. 
 146.  See infra Section IV.B. 
 147.  See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 13 (2011) (“New subparagraph (b)(2)(A) 
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of the former § 1446 simply stated that ”[a] defendant or 
defendants desiring to remove any civil action” must file a “notice 
of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.”148 Thus, there was no statutory language that addressed 
the requirement that all defendants must consent to removal.149 
Conversely, the current statute expressly codifies the rule of 
unanimity, as the court correctly points out.150 By applying statutory 
interpretation to the new § 1446, it is clear that the Eighth Circuit 
court in Griffioen decided correctly. 
In general, “[s]tatutory interpretation is the process of 
determining the meaning of a legislative act called a statute.”151 To 
help interpret a statute, courts have developed numerous “canons 
of construction” to resolve ambiguities.152 “An advantage of the 
canons of construction is that they provide some convenient and 
fairly uniform approaches for interpreting words.”153 
As a general starting point of statutory interpretation, courts 
look at the plain meaning of the words in a statute.154 The plain 
 
codifies the well-established ‘rule of unanimity’ for cases involving multiple 
defendants. Under that rule, which is generally traced to the Supreme Court 
decision in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 251 
(1900), all defendants who have been properly joined and served must join in or 
consent to removal.”); Kotlik, supra note 65, at 261 (“The rule of unanimity is a 
common-law rule that requires all defendants join in the removal of the action.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 148.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2006). 
 149.  See id.; supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 150.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012); Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa 
City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 151.  LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 4 (2d ed. 2013); 
see also RONALD B. BROWN & SHARON J. BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE 
SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT 4 (2d ed. 2011) (“Interpreting the statute is the 
process of figuring out what the statute means.”).  
 152.  See Vaidyanathan v. Seagate U.S. LLC, 691 F.3d 972, 977 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(“But if the statute is ambiguous—that is, if it is susceptible to more than one 
reasonable interpretation—we apply canons of construction to discern the 
legislature’s intent.” (citing Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 363 (Minn. 
2010))); David Kurzweil, Criminal and Civil Rico: Traditional Canons of Statutory 
Interpretation and the Liberal Construction Clause, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 41,  
47–48 (1996) (“[V]arious canons of construction have evolved that help judges to 
resolve ambiguities in the countless statutes that are plagued by poor 
draftsmanship and oversight or that intentionally avoid thorny issues.”). 
 153.  K.K. DuVivier, The Volley of Canons, 26 COLO. LAW. 59, 59 (1997).  
 154.  See Reves v. Ersnt & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 177 (1993) (“In determining 
the scope of a statute, we look first to its language. If the statutory language is 
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meaning canon of construction is a judge-made theory of 
interpreting a statute that asks the court to “ignore legislative 
history if the meaning of a statute is plain on its face.”155 In other 
words, the court determines if the statute can be read 
unambiguously by looking at the actual language of the statute.156 
Dictionaries are a common tool for aiding in the determination of 
the plain meaning of a word in a statute.157 Applying this tool to the 
case in Griffioen,158 the court could have looked at the plain 
meaning of the word “join” found in § 1446.159 “Join” is defined as 
“put[ting] or bring[ing] together so as to form a unit.”160 Albeit a 
weaker argument, an argument could nonetheless be made that, by 
Union Pacific vouching for the Stickle defendants’ consent, Union 
Pacific effectively “put” the Stickle defendants in the consenting 
unit. However, it is unlikely that the court would have decided this 
way, as “join” may still be seen as ambiguous. 
As an alternative to using the plain meaning canon of 
construction or other canons to determine the legislature’s intent 
in enacting a particular statute, the purpose approach is a common 
tool.161 Under the purpose approach, the court first looks at the 
type of problem that the enacted legislation sought to remedy.162 
Once the problem has been identified, the next step is to 
 
unambiguous, in the absence of ‘a clearly expressed legislative intent to the 
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’” (quoting 
United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981))).  
 155.  Bradley C. Karkkainen, “Plain Meaning”: Justice Scalia’s Jurisprudence of 
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 401, 433 (1994). 
 156.  CBS Inc. v. Prime Time 24 Joint Venture, 245 F.3d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir. 
2001). 
 157.  See JELLUM, supra note 151, at 82 (“Most commonly today judges turn to 
their own understanding of a word’s meaning or to dictionaries.”); see also 
Ziperstein v. Tax Comm’r, 423 A.2d 129, 133 (Conn. 1979) (“Where a statute or 
regulation does not define a term, it is appropriate to focus upon its common 
understanding as expressed in the law and upon its dictionary meaning.” (citing 
Hearst Corp. v. State Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation, 308 A.2d 679 (Md. 1973))).  
 158.  Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 
2015). 
 159.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“When a civil action is removed solely 
under section 1441(a), all defendants who have been properly joined and served 
must join in or consent to the removal of the action.” (emphasis added)). 
 160.  Join, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2004). 
 161.  BROWN & BROWN, supra note 151, at 47 (“The purpose approach is 
currently one of the most popular approaches to statutory interpretation.”). 
 162.  See id. at 47–48. 
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determine which interpretation best accomplishes the legislature’s 
goals.163 Applied to the Griffioen case, the problem that the Federal 
Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 remedied 
in § 1446 was the codification of the long-standing common law 
rule of unanimity.164 Accordingly, the courts should interpret the 
language of § 1446’s consent requirement as broadly as possible 
because a narrow reading of this requirement would restrict the 
end result of unanimity, which is what the Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 sought to avoid.165 
Therefore, under the purpose approach, the consent requirement 
should be read to allow a single defendant to vouch for another 
defendant’s consent in order to satisfy the rule of unanimity. 
Another approach worth noting is a textualism approach. 
“Textualism is the treatment of the statutory text as the primary 
source of determining what the legislature intended. . . . Textualists 
point out that the legislature voted only on the statutory language; 
nothing else was enacted.”166 Indeed, textualism is a form of 
interpretation that parallels very closely the plain meaning rule.167 
Under a textualism approach, the court looks at the words of a 
statute, and “makes no attempt to discern any underlying intent of 
the adopting legislature.”168 Accordingly, under a textualism 
approach, the court that is trying to ascertain the legislative intent 
concerning the consent requirement of § 1446 cannot place a limit 
on what is considered proper form for giving consent because the 
text of § 1446 makes no mention about the proper way to give 
consent.169 The court in Griffioen correctly points out that the 
legislature had the ability to prescribe the form for giving consent, 
 
 163.  See id. at 48. 
 164.  See H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 13 (2011) (“New subparagraph (b)(2)(A) 
codifies the well-established ‘rule of unanimity’ for cases involving multiple 
defendants.”). 
 165.  See id.  
 166.  BROWN & BROWN, supra note 151, at 52–53 (emphasis added). 
 167.  JELLUM, supra note 151, at 27 (“Textualism is sometimes called the plain 
meaning theory of interpretation because textualism is based on the plain meaning 
canon of interpretation.”). 
 168.  FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
25 (2009); see also JELLUM, supra note 151, at 27 (“Only the text goes through this 
process; thus, textualists believe that looking beyond the enacted text raises 
constitutional concerns.”). 
 169.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) (2012). 
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but declined to do so.170 The textualism approach is thus consistent 
with the holding in Griffioen. 
B. Implications of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
The court in Griffioen points out that the possibility of Rule 11 
sanctions against the attorney who is asserting that all defendants 
consent to removal is a policy consideration in favor of allowing a 
sole defendant to consent for its codefendants.171 As previously 
discussed, this policy implication is widely used among courts that 
allow a sole defendant to give consent for all.172 However, the court 
in Griffioen should have also examined the policy implications 
brought upon the attorney who gives consent as it relates to the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
The American Bar Association is tasked with writing and 
editing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.173 The Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct serve as an ethical guide to 
attorneys.174 Accordingly, an attorney who violates one of the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct is subjecting himself or herself to 
disciplinary action.175 In the application of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to the scenario in Griffioen, two rules are 
implicated. 
Rule 3.1 requires an attorney to “not bring or defend a 
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a 
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous . . . .”176 In other 
words, an attorney is not allowed to file a motion that is frivolous or 
 
 170.  Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185–87 
(8th Cir. 2015) (“Congress could have defined with equal specificity the form of or 
time for consent but chose not to do so.”). 
 171.  See id. at 1187–88 (explaining that Rule 11 prevents defendants from 
making misrepresentations concerning unanimous consent). 
 172.  See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 173.  See LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE 
PRACTICE OF LAW 14 (2d ed. 2008). 
 174.  See Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.2d 271, 275 (N.J. 1998) (“By this language, the 
ABA ‘intended to make clear that the purpose of the Model Rules was to regulate 
lawyer conduct through the disciplinary process, not to serve as a basis for civil 
liability.’”). 
 175.  See id.; LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 21 (“[T]he highest court in 
each state is ultimately responsible for enforcing its rules by disciplining lawyers 
who violate them.”). 
 176.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983) (emphasis 
added). 
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obviously false.177 In a way, Rule 3.1 mimics Rule 11 in the sense 
that an attorney is not allowed to bring a claim that is frivolous.178 
However, a violation of Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct has different disciplinary consequences.179 Specifically, 
violating the Model Rules of Professional Conduct results in a bar 
disciplinary action, where violating Rule 11 can result in sanctions 
set forth by a judge.180 Applied to the Griffioen case, there is a policy 
consideration that the lawyer who asserts that all defendants 
consent to the action is subjecting him or herself to disciplinary 
action by the state bar association. Similar to the policy 
consideration of Rule 11 to which the Eighth Circuit alludes,181 the 
threat of state bar disciplinary action for violating Rule 3.1 of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct serves as a “safeguard[] to 
prevent removing defendants from making false representations of 
unanimous consent and forcing codefendants into a federal forum 
against their will.”182 
The second rule that is applicable to the Griffioen case is Rule 
3.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.183 Rule 3.3 
mandates that a lawyer shall not “knowingly make a false statement of 
fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of 
material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 
lawyer.”184 In other words, Rule 3.3 disallows a lawyer from making a 
false statement to the court.185 The rule requires the lawyer to make 
 
 177.  See James W. MacFarlane, Frivolous Conduct Under Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 3.1, 21 J. LEGAL PROF. 231, 231 (1996); Richard P. Mauro, The Chilling Effect 
that the Threat of Sanctions Can Have on Effective Representation in Capital Cases, 36 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 417, 427–28 (2007) (explaining that “[a] ‘frivolous’ claim is 
generally thought to be one which is ‘obviously false on the face of the pleading.’” 
(quoting Monroe H. Freedman, The Professional Obligation to Raise Frivolous Issues in 
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1167, 1171 (2003))). 
 178.  Compare MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.1, with FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 179.  See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 602. 
 180.  See id. (“Violation of Rule 3.1 can result in bar disciplinary action against 
an attorney. A violation of FRCP 11 is punished not by the state bar but by the 
judge in the civil action, and it can result in nonmonetary directives or monetary 
sanctions against a lawyer or a party.”). 
 181.  See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1187 
(8th Cir. 2015). 
 182.  Id.  
 183.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3. 
 184.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 185.  LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 606 (“Rule 3.3(a)(1) bars false 
statements to courts by lawyers themselves, as opposed to false testimony by clients 
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assertions that he or she knows to be true, or believes to be true 
based on a “diligent inquiry.”186 
Similar to the application of Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 3.3, if violated, subjects the attorney to 
discipline by the state bar association.187 Therefore, allowing an 
attorney to sign an affidavit which purports to give consent for all 
codefendants should be allowed under § 1446 because of the threat 
of discipline from the state bar association under Rule 3.3.188 
Similar to the threat of Rule 11 sanctions under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, an attorney is certifying that the allegations set 
forth in a motion are true and should therefore suffice as consent 
of all the parties. 
C. The Possibility for Misuse 
Although the Eighth Circuit was correct in its application of    
§ 1446, the doors for misuse have nonetheless been opened as a 
result of this holding.189 Under the vouching rule, which the Eighth 
Circuit effectively adopted with its holding,190 the potential for 
forcing a codefendant into federal court is heightened because a 
sole defendant could intentionally misrepresent to the court that 
all defendants consented to removal, thereby forcing a 
codefendant into federal court.191 This is one of the particular 
problems that the rule of unanimity seeks to redress.192 It is true 
 
or other witnesses.”). 
 186.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3 cmt. 3 (“However, an assertion 
purporting to be on the lawyer’s own knowledge, as in an affidavit by the lawyer or 
in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows 
the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent 
inquiry.”). 
 187.  See LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 173, at 602. 
 188.  See supra notes 179–82 and accompanying text. 
 189.  Creekmore v. Food Lion, Inc., 797 F. Supp. 505, 509 (E.D. Va. 1992) 
(“To allow one party, through counsel, to bind or represent the position of other 
parties without their express consent to be so bound would have serious adverse 
repercussions, not only in removal situations but in any incident of litigation.”). 
 190.  See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text. 
 191.  Prescott, supra note 21, at 265. 
 192.  See Sansone v. Morton Mach. Works, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 
(D.R.I. 2002) (“Other purposes are to eliminate the risk of inconsistent state and 
federal adjudications, and to prevent one defendant from imposing his choice of 
forum upon other unwilling defendants and an unwilling plaintiff.”); Spillers v. 
Tillman, 959 F. Supp. 364, 369 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (explaining that the 
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that in a situation where an unwilling defendant is forced into 
federal court because of misrepresentation, the unwilling 
defendant can seek to have the case remanded to state court.193 
However, remanding a case to state court can involve problems 
both with the federal court and the state court.194 Moreover, the 
unwilling defendant may decide not to file a motion to remand to 
state court.195 This decision could be based on a number of factors, 
including the probability of success, time constraints, cost of court 
filings, attorney’s fees, or the result of the significant delay 
associated with remanding an action to state court.196 Contrary to 
the vouching rule, the independent-and-unambiguous rule allows a 
defendant to easily point out that removal to federal court is not 
appropriate because the non-consenting defendant did not file his 
or her individual consent to removal.197 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Griffioen, the court was presented with a difficult question: 
whether a sole defendant, who files a motion to remove to federal 
court, may give consent for its codefendants when that sole 
defendant signs a local rule certification that subjects the sole 
defendant to Rule 11 sanctions.198 Since the common law rule of 
unanimity was first formed in the United States in 1900, the circuit 
courts have been at odds with each other regarding the proper 
 
“[a]pplication of the unanimity rule to federal question cases . . . prevents one 
defendant from imposing his choice of forum upon other unwilling defendants     
. . . .”); Prescott, supra note 21, at 265. 
 193.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2012); Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l Inc., 392 
F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the non-consenting defendant 
could remand the case to state court if the defendant did not, in fact, consent to 
removal in the first place). 
 194.  See Rebecca Martin, New Problems with Removal and the ALI, 54 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 489, 502–05 (2006) (“[I]nitially federal district courts began to assert in dicta 
and holdings the power to remand entire federal question cases that had been 
removed from state courts. Later, numerous circuit courts wrote opinions that 
asserted that they in fact did not have the discretion to remand whole cases that 
included federal questions to state court. Instead, these courts argued that the 
discretion to remand cases to state court was limited.”). 
 195.  See Prescott, supra note 21, at 265. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  See id. at 252. 
 198.  See Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1185–87 
(8th Cir. 2015). 
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form for consenting to removal to federal court.199 The enactment 
of the Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 
2011, which codified the rule of unanimity,200 makes no mention of 
the proper way to give consent.201 Correctly, the court reasoned that 
through one of the canons of interpretation—legislative intent—
Congress could have specified the form of consent required for a 
defendant who joins in the removal.202 Analyzing legislative intent 
—using plain meaning, the purpose approach, and textualism—
shows that the court’s analysis was further substantiated. The court 
in Griffioen could have analyzed another policy implication—an 
attorney’s ethical challenges in terms of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The application of the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct to the lawyers who sign and certify the notice 
of removal pursuant to Rule 11 importantly supports the theory 
that a single defendant may give consent for its codefendants.203 
This is shown by the threat of state bar disciplinary actions imposed 
on an attorney who violates one of the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct.204 In a sense, the threat of bar disciplinary actions mimics 
the policy implication for allowing a sole defendant to give consent 
for its codefendants brought about by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure.205 Additionally, the policy implications of Rule 
11 support the notion that a defendant may vouch for consent of 
its codefendants, subject to a local rule certification that may 
implicate sanctions.206 
In sum, the Eighth Circuit accurately analyzed § 1446 and the 
consent requirement. However, the holding in Griffioen could 
nonetheless lead to a misuse of the removal statute in an attempt to 
force a defendant into federal court.207 Until the exact form of 
consent is codified in statute, the consent requirement of the rule 
 
 199.  See supra Section II.C. 
 200.  See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. 
L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1446). 
 201.  See id. 
 202.  See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187 (“Congress could have defined with equal 
specificity the form of or time for consent but chose not to do so.”); supra notes 
168–70 and accompanying text. 
 203.  See supra notes 176–88 and accompanying text. 
 204.  See supra notes 176–88 and accompanying text. 
 205.  See supra note 178 and accompanying text. 
 206.  See Griffioen, 785 F.3d at 1187. 
 207.  See supra notes 189–96 and accompanying text. 
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of unanimity will perpetually confound the courts that analyze        
§ 1446 in a context similar to Griffioen. 
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